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Book Reviews 
Knowledge, Value and Belief 
H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr. and Daniel Callahan, Editors 
Hastings Center, Hastings-an-Hudson, N. Y., 1977. 365 pp., $7.95 (paper). 
Scholars familiar with the growing literature in bioethics will welcome this 
second volume in a projected four-volume series entitled The Foundations of 
Ethics and Its R elationship to Science. The result of interdisciplinary studies at 
The Hastings Center, the first two volumes attempt to go beyond the considera-
tion of particular moral problems to explore the broad theoretical and contextual 
interrelatedness of science, technology and ethics. 
In a long introductory article, Tristram Engelhardt sketches the philosophical 
context of questions raised and synthesizes the main insights achieved by the 
authors. Four broad issues are addressed in the present volume: 1) whether an 
adequate account of ethics requires an appeal to transcendence; 2) whether ration-
ality is unitary or fragmented into unreconcilable accounts of reality; 3) values 
and obligations inherent in the professions ; and 4) which interdisciplinary discus-
sions provide a coherent overview of science and the humanities (p . 6). 
The first set of papers examines the appeal to the existence of God as the 
foundation of ethics, especially with regard to motivation for acting ethically. In 
reviewing Kant 's account of the metaphysical foundations of ethics, Alasdair 
MacIntyre argues that a commitment to history as a moral progression provides a 
more tenable summum bonum than belief in God to motivate ethical action. The 
individual's acceptance of absolute moral principles must be viewed as part of a 
larger history of a group or institution. 
But Paul Ramsey agreees with Kant that a complete system of ethics requires 
an appeal to God at least as a practical postulate. Ramsey develops a view of the 
moral life in which moral norms are derived from the religious dimension itself in 
such a way that "religion is ethics and ethics is religion" (p. 59). The ensuing 
discussions bring out the decisive influence of rationality on the moral life, 
including the religious way of life . 
This appeal to the centrality of rationality in ethics is challenged by David 
Burrell and Stanley Hauerwas in their emphasis on the importance of narrative to 
account for moral character and virtue. These authors stress the contextual nature 
of morality and argue that the foundations of ethics are partly irrational, stem-
ming from participation in a particular moral narrative. 
In his commentary, Edmund Pellegrino agrees with Burrell and Hauerwas that 
ethics is more than a process of solving problems and must include moral narrative 
to accommodate individual nuances of moral life . Nevertheless, Pellegrino argues 
that Burrell 's and Hauerwas ' account of ethics fails to provide adequate grounds 
for deciding which narratives are morally superior and hence is open to charges of 
subjectivity and relativism. 
Articles by Hans Jonas, Gunther Stent and Bernard Towers attempt to provide 
generally compelling accounts of the ethical order, focusing on the "standard 
account, " an ethical viewpoint which a disinterested observer should be able to 
achieve and use in solving moral problems. In "The Concept of Responsibility: Its 
Place in an Ethical Theory for the Technological Age, " Jonas argues that in a 
dynamic view of reality such as science and cosmology present today, the central 
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fact for ethics is that actions with which we now have to deal have" an unprece-
dented causal reach into the future" which "moves respo nsibility into the center 
of ethics, where it has never stood before " (p. 169). Jonas claims that man 's sheer 
existence provides an ontological basis for his moral responsibility to continue the 
life and quality of living of the human species. 
Callahan draws out the implications of Jonas ' theory of responsibility for a 
technological age, but he questions whether Jonas' ontological imperat ive can be 
maintained when no goals are provided toward which human life should strive. 
Callahan agrees that the parent-child model for responsibility can be fruitfully 
applied to the relationships between science and mankind, especially as the human 
race looks increasingly to science and technology for survival in crises. 
With Teilhard de Chard in, Towers is much more optimistic that the evolution-
ary development of the universe is toward increasing complexity of consciousness, 
and that the scientific account of evolution can provide the groundwork for a 
theory of moral responsibility. What is needed today, according to Towers, is an 
open, pluralistic ethic , adapt ive to diverse and changing circumstances, thus guar-
anteeing the establishment of a worldwide community sharing personal and social 
goods in peace and stability. 
But Stent rejects as "hard-core scientism" the notion that descriptive science 
can provide the basis for moral responsibility. He argues for a structural account 
of knowledge to reveal "an ethical deep structure" innate and common to all men, 
which gives rise to a "concrete moral code of the surface structure through a 
transformational process" (pp. 242-243). 
In striking a critical balance between the two positions, Patrick Heelan notes 
that Towers ' theory of developing consciousness does not rely on unambiguously 
scientific description but assumes that these explanations have a mutuality with 
goal-oriented or person-oriented accounts of the evolutionary process. In Heelan's 
judgment, Towers' theory of evolving complexity-consciousness is not truly suc-
cessful without a T e ilhardian appeal to the transcendent to demonstrate that there 
is indeed a psychic convergence operative in mankind today . 
On the other hand, Heelan sees Stent's structuralist theory of the basis of 
ethics as incapable of providing a rigorous account of the plurality of ethical 
p rinciples found in soc iet ies. Deep structures may be said to influence the form of 
ethical conduct but not its content. 
The remaining articles address less speculative but important contemporary 
topics. Stephen Toulmin makes a useful contribution to the growing body of 
literature on professionalism. He establishes criteria for professionalism and 
foc uses on problems arising from conflicting duties faced by professionals in the 
exercise of their skills. Toulmin suggests that the hierarchy of priorities which 
professional codes imply should help resolve the conflicts generated by the various 
roles upon which an individual is called to play. 
A different explanation of conflicts and their resolution is offered by Thomas 
Nagel. Conflicting values and claims faced by professionals may be viewed as part 
of a larger moral problem caused by a disparity between the fragmentation of 
value and the singleness of decision (p . 279). Nagel discusses five basic classes of 
value, rejects the hierarchical ordering of these classes as a method of resolving 
conflicts, and suggests instead that Aristotle's model of practical wisdom employ-
ing a variety of different conceptual frameworks is still the most effective way to 
resolve conflicts of value. 
Eric Cassell brings out the same interdependency of individuals and conflicting 
claims in his account of error in medicine which, in his view, is complex and 
contextual. The physician must function as scientist, technologist and member of 
a particular community with its own expectations of medicine and technology . 
Cassell analyzes how these understandings of medicine generate views of medical 
error, and the ways in which concepts of disease dictate medical practice. 
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